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1. Introduction
In the ten years of the existence of the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement
system, eighty cases have led to the adoption of the Panel Reports and sixty-one to the adoption of
the Appellate Body (AB) Reports. Among these cases, the enforcement mechanism of last resort-
countermeasure has been resorted to eight times. The eight cases include, EC – Bananas (US), EC
– Bananas (Ecuador),1 EC – Hormones (US, Canada),2 Brazil – Aircraft,3 FSC,4 Canada – Aircraft II,5
US – 1916 Act,6 and the ”Byrd Amendment”.7 This number is almost four times more than those
under the forty-seven year life-span of the WTO’s predecessor-the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) 1947. On the other hand, there are also cases where compliance with the
dispute settlement reports has been contested.8 
The relatively frequent recourse to countermeasures and the disagreement with the level of
compliance presumably suggest that the present enforcement regime of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) reports seems to be arduous.9 We therefore contend in this writing that
the weakness of countermeasures is not because countermeasures by nature cannot induce
compliance, but because the WTO countermeasures are not coercive enough to induce
compliance. The traditional international law counter-measures (which may be collective) were
codified by the International Law Commission (ILC) on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Act in 2001 and are presumably applicable to all fields of international
law where there arises a question of state responsibility, except there is a derogation provided for
by a particular regime. Classical treaty law also considers a material breach of a multilateral treaty
by one party as a sufficient ground for the suspension in part or in whole of the operation of the
treaty by other parties to the treaty.10 Neither the panel nor the Appellate Body (AB) has really
considered addressing these issues in its rulings and recommendations since the establishment of
the WTO; though a number of academic writings and dispute settlement reports suggest that the
WTO regime should not be conceived as an isolated field of international law. 
The following section of this paper examines from a more general perspective the use of collective
remedies under international law. The third section of the paper presents the debate on collective
countermeasures developed in the ILC’s draft Articles. This, we will call solidarity measures.11 By
using past panels and AB jurisprudence, section four sets forth arguments in support of the view
that acceding to the WTO engages the State so doing to a multilateral engagement, which may be
invoked by any WTO Member at any time in case of a breach. Section five makes the case for
solidarity measures in the WTO dispute settlement, while section six deals with the conclusions.
2. Collective Remedies under International Law
Remedies under international law have always been traditionally viewed as something more
bilateral than collective.12 Thus, according to this view, only states which have directly suffered
injuries from an illegal act can claim damages.13 But recent events and practices in the
international legal system have proven this traditional view not necessarily correct. As early as in
1915, Eliahu Root argued that states engaging in the illegal use of force or taking other actions
which constitute threats to law and order in the international community should be subject to
remedies from other states which are not directly injured by the defendant’s illegal act.14 
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The incorporation of collective countermeasures into the international legal system is based on the
assumption that international agreements from a broad perspective have a multilateral effect in
the events of their violation. The remedies at the disposal of a directly injured state may also be
inadequate for such state to make a recalcitrant state to respect its obligations under international
law. Seeking the participation of third states for the eventual application of collective remedies in
such a situation may be seen as a desirable alternative. It could also be possible that a directly
injured state may be capable of imposing sufficient sanctions on a recalcitrant state; but due to
blatant and widespread violation of international law the application of a sufficient unilateral
countermeasure is often not possible. For instance, during the war in the Persian Gulf between
Iraq and Iran, the safety of neutral vessels was threatened. The United Nations intervened and did
not oppose other neutral states that deployed forces in the Gulf to protect their flags and other
flag vessels from illegal attacks from those engaged in battle.15
There is no world police to command or coerce obedience to international law rules. Instead, the
international community has to rely on the combination of other mechanisms such as
countermeasures to win respect and compliance for these duties. The jurisprudence of the WTO
Dispute Settlement System (DSS) suggests alternatively that collective countermeasures against the
impairment or nullification of WTO law are still alien in the practice of the system.16 For the
reason stated above, countermeasures must be effective in the sense that in their collective form;
the rights of smaller states to a particular agreement would be respected as much as the rights of
powerful member states. Countermeasures must also be effective in order to achieve its primary
purpose of inducing compliance. 
In the first place, when we try to establish a case law argument for third states remedies in
international law, we would often rely upon the land-mark Wimbledon case in which the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) allowed third party members of a multilateral treaty to
intervene.17 The PCIJ in this case allowed Poland to intervene, though it had no interest in the
case. The basis for Poland’s intervention rested on the fact that it was a party to the Treaty of
Versailles which had been violated by Germany. Though the Wimbledon case seems to have
established only a good procedural support for third states intervention in third party adjudication
under international law, it does provides some supportive arguments for collective action under
international dispute resolutions. This is based on the theory that legal rights belong to all parties
to a multilateral treaty. 
3. International Law Codification and Collective Remedies
Recent codifications of international law reflect the desire of the international community to
clearly bring to the fore the idea of collective countermeasures in case of a continuous violation of
international law.18 The draft articles prepared by the International Law Commission (ILC)19are
important in the evaluation of the application of collective countermeasures in the WTO Dispute
Settlement Mechanism (DSM). The adoption in August 2001 by the ILC of its articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally wrongful acts clearly marked a defining moment in the
more than half a century journey of the work of the ILC on the definition of the nature of the
obligations of States and other actors in international law. The ILC has undergone a long journey
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in accomplishing its duties on the codification of customary international law in the field of state
responsibility. 
The issue of solidarity measures occupied an important part of the debates in the ILC’s work as it
is demonstrated in Article 54 of the Draft. In the last years of the ILC work, the role of third states
as regards the enforcement of the decisions of an international tribunal formed one of the three
most important substantive problems to resolve. The other two main issues were the fate of States’
crimes and the delimitation of the notion of ‘injured State,’20 However, the ILC work in its draft
stage has already attracted attention from international adjudicating body, as seen from the
comments of J. Charpentier and G. Apollis in the Rainbow Warrior Case.21 Though, without
detailed guidelines on invoking solidarity measures, perhaps the best support for collective
countermeasures against a state for a continuous violation of a multilateral treaty is found in the
ILC’s Articles. Even if not promptly adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations as
the case may be, the ILC’s Articles now represents an authoritative restatement of customary
international law,22which maybe useful in a sense for international dispute resolution.
Consequently from this viewpoint, the ILC’s Articles seemingly appear as a relevant starting point
for solidarity measures in the enforcement of member states obligations under the multilateral
trading system. 
3.1. The importance of the ILCs Draft on approaching Collective Remedies
Prior to the adoption of the last draft of the Commission’s report in 2001, some members made
candid statements indicating that the outcome of the Commission’s final reports would be a
significant move towards the ‘construction of international public law.’23 Such statements were far
from being wrong. As pointed out above, the final Articles of the Commission’s work adopted in
2001 might seemingly not be open for signatures by Members of the United Nations. It might take
the form of a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations. However, it appears that
if there is no diplomatic conference to sanction the application of the Articles, the ILC’s work will
best serve the needs of the international community only if it is weighed, interpreted, and applied
with much care.24 This is no surprise. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),
which is widely applied now by international courts ”as customary international law and not by its
reason of being treaty”, witnessed the same care.25 In a way, the proposal on collective
countermeasures in the ILC’s Articles may be seen as ‘the beginning of international public
enforcement.’26 
However, the question whether a non-injured state should be allowed to go with the directly
injured state or entirely on her own, seemed to have presented some difficulties in the final stages
of the work of the Commission.27 The sensitive nature of the issue explained why some of the
Commission’s members were quite cautious about it. On the other hand, the importance of
collective countermeasures in the Commission’s work was further developed by the proposal of
James Crawford in 2000. In the proposal, Crawford identified two scenarios where collective
countermeasures could be imposed in order to enforce the rulings of an international tribunal. 
First, the injured state could request assistance from a third state, where it finds itself incapable of
inducing the recalcitrant state to respect the rulings of the tribunal. Secondly, third states may
collectively impose countermeasures when they perceive that the responsibility breached is of a
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general interest.28 Hence, the rationale for the latter is based on what Martti Koskenniemi describes
as ”solidarity measures.”29 And, as mentioned earlier, we will be using it interchangeably with
collective countermeasures in this writing. Though some governments preferred rather to shift the
issue of collective countermeasures to the discretionary power and general mandate of the Security
Council, Crawford’s proposal received a wide degree of support from within and outside the ILC. 
The grudging wariness with which the Commission viewed the importance of countermeasures
permeated the entire project.30 However, the importance of the work of the Commission has not
only sparked a stream of intellectual writings by academics,31 but also attention from an
international adjudicating body.32 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the ILC have so far
had a protracted relationship. It is not only that the ICJ makes citations from the work of the ILC,
but also the ILC members have always been elected members of the Court.33 Not withstanding the
difficulties that surrounded the task of the Commission members, the ILC draft is an important
step toward the codification of customary international law. 
3.2. The ILC’s Articles and Legal Regimes without specification on particular remedy
One open-ended question as regards different legal regimes is when such regimes do not provide
for specific remedies. But a regime with specific rules on how to clinch differences stemming from
such a regime may provide a definitive leeway for disputes resolution. The usefulness of such a
regime also stems from the fact that it may provide better access to the will of the parties intended
to be bound by such treaty as the case may be. But when the lex specialis nature of such a regime
fails for instance, in the domain of remedies, the whole issue of specific remedies appropriate for
the illegality at hand may fall back to what might be ascertained by the judge as the common
intention or the will of the parties at the time of concluding the treaty in question. Thus, either
the ‘common intention’ of the parties or general international law would be the guiding force for
the judiciary in such a case.34 This issue appeared to have been handled in a more general manner
by the PCIJ in the Chorzow Factories case.35 Though it may be difficult to say with certainty when
a lex specialis has failed, if the limitation of lex specialis can only be cured by general or customary
practice, the conclusion of the ILC’s work demonstrated a significant move towards the
codification of the rule of customs in the international sphere.36 Furthermore, a special regime
may also be complemented not on the basis of a particular failure, but to fill lacunae. If such cases
concern closing a gap without which certain objectives might not be achieved; for instance,
inducing compliance by countermeasures in the case of WTO jurisprudence, a resort to classical
treaty law maybe unavoidable. Thus, Article 60.2 of the VCLT which is presumably by its nature
applicable to all domains of public international law (including the WTO law), considers a
material breach of a multilateral treaty, as a sufficient ground by other parties to the treaty to
suspend in part or in whole or to terminate altogether the operation of such treaty against the
defaulting party.37 
In Part Four article 55 of the ILC’s draft Articles, dealing with lex specialis, the draft applies only
where there is no provision under a particular convention governing the wrongful act committed.38
There is a presumption that the draft will be very useful for an adjudicating body where there is a
lacuna as regards a particular treaty provisions. To this extent, (assuming it represents an
authoritative text or an authoritative restatement of customary international law) the ILC draft may
be applicable if not directly, indirectly to the dispute settlement regime of the WTO.
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4. Contextual Issues
In the perspective of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), article 19.1 sentence
two is to the effect that in addition to the recommendations of the panel or Appellate Body (AB),
they may suggest ways of implementation of their decisions to the non-compliant Member. To this
extent, article 19.1 does not prejudge the limit of the panel in making such suggestions. In line
with this reasoning, the DSU does not preclude the suggestion of a specific remedy. The WTO
Agreement is an international treaty, and acts committed in breach of an international treaty
amount to international wrongful acts. Parties to an international treaty would not just sit and
watch another contracting party walk away from their international obligations under such treaty.
From this perspective, the ILC’s draft is consequently relevant for the evaluation of the necessity
of solidarity measures under the WTO Agreements.
Many negotiators in Geneva may be quite sceptical as regards this view. The scepticism stems from
the fact that they consider the WTO regime to be quite special in itself (lex specialis), as opposed to
other branches of general international law. Eventually, they are ‘insulated from general public
international law.’39 
Much has been said about the special nature of the WTO law.40 The question one would ask at
this juncture is; how special WTO law really is? It is worth noting that being a Member of the
WTO creates international obligations, which Members must respect in good faith. The principle
of Pacta Sunt Servanda which applies to all international law obligations including those of the
WTO requires States to respect their treaty obligations in good faith.41 This principle, at once a
principle of law and a general principle of international law, controls the exercise of rights by
WTO Members.42 Joost Pauwelyn rightly argues that, 
”[S]tates in their treaty relations, can contract out of one, more or in theory, all rules of
general international law (other than those of jus cogens), but they cannot contract out of the
system of international law. As soon as states contract with one another, they do so
automatically and necessarily within the system of international law.”43 
By implication, the moment the accession process to the WTO of a particular State is completed;
such Member will be subjected within the system of international law to conform its trade
practices to the treaty text obligations of the WTO and annexed agreements. 
However, the debate on whether to conceive international economic law such as GATT/WTO in
isolation from the general corpus of international law has long been contentious within the
academic circles. In his report on the Societé Francaise Pour le Droit International, Prosper Weil
argued that international economic law has the same place as the law of treaties and the law of
neutrality in international law.44 The understanding of the meaning of ‘self contained’ regime in
itself seems to be very uncertain. Nonetheless, in its first report, the AB acknowledged that the
WTO Agreement and its annexes are not to be read in clinical isolation from public international
law.45 This judgment seems to have been confirmed and followed in subsequent dispute
settlement rulings.46
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In this particular respect, the ILC’s Articles have dealt with the issue of countermeasures taken by
third States and where the responsibility is owed to the international community at large (erga
omnes).47 Collective countermeasures may also be invoked in a situation where the responsibility
is owed to a group of States of which the State taking the countermeasure is a member and the
obligation is established for the protection of the collective interests of that group of States. Taking
into account the fact that WTO rules are rapidly expanding in the sense of the parties that they
affect, there is a strong reason to consider WTO obligations as multilateral and not merely
bilateral.48 Any breach of WTO obligations affects not only members as governments, but also
individual companies, consumers and other economic operators in the domestic and global
market places. Furthermore, pursuant to DSU Article 3.8, a breach of a particular WTO
obligation affects not only a particular WTO Member, but all the Members to the agreement in
question. Thus, a particular breach has a multilateral effect.49 
The panel in the United States Section 301-310 case stressed the importance of the ”creation of
market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global market
places”.50 Indeed, the panel recognised the importance of the individual consumers and
undertakings in various member states when applying a measure within the WTO disciplines. The
arbitration has also pointed out that the DSU has very significant objectives, 
”[t]he most relevant in our view are those which relate to the creation of market conditions
conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets and to the provision
of a secure and predictable multilateral trading system.”51 
The Arbitration reiterated on the fact that the DSU is the WTO cornerstone for providing
predictability and security to the entire WTO disciplines and through it that of the market place
and its different operators.52 
With this in mind, there is an incentive to believe that a nullification or impairment of benefits
accruing to any member state to the WTO treaty entails a breach of responsibility under a
multilateral treaty.53 Thus, such wrongdoers shall be compelled or induced to bring their measures
into conformity with their responsibility under the WTO law and also be liable for the provision
of compensation.54 Furthermore, on appeal in the EC – Bananas III case, the AB upheld the panel
rulings that the increased interdependence of the global economy is a glaring indication that any
WTO Member has an interest in any particular violation. Thus, all WTO ”Members have a stake
in enforcing the WTO rules” now more than ever.55 To this extent, the ILC’s draft Articles deal
with collective countermeasures by permitting states not ‘directly injured’ by the illegal measures
to invoke the responsibility of other States and take countermeasures where there is continuous
violation of a treaty obligation.56 
The issue of collective implementation of the rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) seem
to have been taken note of, though has rarely been literally raised. According to the second
sentence of DSU Article 21.6,
 ”[T]he issue of implementation of recommendations or rulings may be raised at the DSB by
any Member at any time following their adoption.”57 
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Alternatively, since the purpose of countermeasures in the DSU (suspension of concessions as in
WTO parlance) is to induce compliance,58 the ILC’s draft seem to be more clear on this issue59 in
the sense that the ILC’s Articles provide a good basis for the arguments for collective
countermeasures in the context of the DSU. 
5. The Case for Solidarity Measures in Enforcing DSB Rulings and Recommendations 
The underlining rationale for a call for solidarity measures in the context of the DSB rulings and
recommendations enforcement process would depend on whether a violation of a particular WTO
covered agreement would be seen as a breach of a Member’s obligation under international law
and also largely on the implications of a non-compliance with the WTO law. In this context,
having made these determinations in the foregoing sections, it is still not self-evident why
alternative enforcement possibilities under customary rules of State Responsibility cannot be
resorted to if the remedy (suspension of concessions by the ‘directly injured’ state alone) under the
DSU appears illusory to result in compliance.60 It is true, that the DSU in itself does not explicitly
provide any real guidance or reference to the general rules of State Responsibility in the context
of the WTO, let alone a possibility to resort to an alternative enforcement regime provided for by
the customary rules of State Responsibility in a situation where the DSU becomes insufficient to
respond to continues violation of a relevant WTO treaty commitment.61 It is also true that even
if the panels or the AB on its own, make use of the customary rules of State Responsibility, their
recommendations cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations of Members under a
covered agreement.62 But, it is clear that the concept of violation and or nullifications or
impairment of benefits presupposes both the determination that a Member has failed to carry out
its conventional obligations and the establishment of the legal consequences stemming from such
conduct.63 
The fact that the DSU is silent about the invocation of other rules of international law such as
those provided for under the law of State Responsibility to counter breaches of the WTO
Agreements presumably implies that the WTO Members have not contracted out of those rules.64
Consequently, the DSU only sets forth a number of rules dealing with the consequences of a
particular breach of the WTO Agreements. This means that these rules in themselves can still be
less exhaustive and may require other international rules or customary rules to complement
them.65 It is also clear from the ILC’s Articles that to the extent that there is no special regime (lex
specialis) taking care of a continuous violation of a treaty, the ILC’s Articles will be valid in the
enforcement of such a treaty.66 Thus, by inference, assuming that the ILC work also represents the
‘common intention’ of the multilateral community; Article 54 ‘solidarity measures’ of the ILC’s
codified customary law would be relevant in the context of the WTO treaty system.67
In the context of DSU Article 3.2, there is already an understanding that the DSU was not meant
to be an exhaustive set of rules. Any relevant rules of international law can be used by the panel
and or the AB when interpreting the provisions of the WTO covered agreements, so long as the
interested parties are also parties to those set of rules in question.68 With this in mind,
presumably, the extent to which non-WTO rules would be relevant in a particular dispute would
still largely depend on the will of the parties and probably the reasoning of the panels or the AB.
For instance, in the EC – Computer Equipment,69 the AB, in rejecting one of the decisions of the
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panel, expressed regrets as to why the panel did not consider the Harmonized System and its
Explanatory Notes to which both the EC and the US were parties to, during the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round trade negotiations.70
Article 48 of the ILC’s Articles establishes grounds on which other Members, other than a directly
injured state for a breach of a convention can invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoing state
while Article 54 states;
The Chapter does not prejudice the right of any State, entitled under article 48, paragraph 1
to invoke the responsibility of another State, to take lawful measures against that State to
ensure cessation of the breach and reparation in the interests of the beneficiaries of the
obligations breached.”
Conversely, DSU Article 3.2 clearly states the objective of WTO dispute settlement. It states; 
”…[T]he Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members
under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.”
If by virtue of the provisions of DSU Article 3.2, Article 54 of the ILC’s work is used by the panels
or AB, as a codified version of customary practice, it would be doing so only because it would serve
to preserve the WTO Member’s rights and obligations under the relevant covered agreements.71
But, by virtue of Article 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU, it has been argued that the WTO Members did
not intend to incorporate customary international law rules into the WTO acquis, other than
those dealing with treaty interpretations, as provided for under Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT.72
With this in mind, other aspects of general international law can only be incorporated into the
WTO acquis when there is a renvoi to such rules under a particular covered agreement.73 But, this
view may somehow be misleading, if we conceive inter-state relations as an evolving process. Even
if the WTO law is considered self-contained from different angles, its operation may be
conditioned ‘by its legal-systemic environment’.74 The fact that DSU Article 3.2 seem to be
referring only to the question of interpretation as under customary international law does not
mean that Article 3.2 of the DSU shut its door to all other aspects of customary international law
when dealing with a particular dispute under the WTO Agreements.75 The panels and the AB
have applied other general international law rules and even some concepts embedded in Member
states practices, when dealing with aspects unrelated to interpretation. For example, In US – Wool
Shirts and Blouses, the AB in order to determine the party to which the burden of proof rested, held
that: ”…[v]arious international tribunals, including the International Court of Justice, have
generally and consistently accepted and applied the rule that the party who asserts a fact, whether
a claimant or the respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. Also, it is a generally-
accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions that the
burden of proof rests upon the party whether complaining or defending, who asserts the
affirmative of a particular claim or defence.”76 
Furthermore, the panels and the AB have in a number of cases referred to other international law
practices unrelated to treaty interpretation such as, locus standi,77 and manifest error in the
formation of a treaty etc.78 
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5.1. ILC Article 55 lex specialis in the context of WTO dispute settlement countermeasures
From the foregoing section, it may be understood that the WTO Members did not intend to
prioritise the use of countermeasures. The countermeasures are meant to be resorted to only when
there is a continuous violation of agreed negotiated tariff commitments. A countermeasure is thus
a fall-back in the event of non-compliance with a particular dispute settlement report.79 This also
seems to be true under other international practices. For instance, the ICJ in the Gabcikovo-
Nagimaros Project stated that countermeasure must only be taken when the injured State has called
upon the Wrongdoing State to discontinue its wrongful act and to make reparation, to no avail.
The purpose of the countermeasures must be to induce compliance with an international
obligation.80 
Alternatively, with the current situation in the WTO, this function can only be attained if there
are sufficient trade relations between the directly affected Member and the implementing
Member. But in certain cases, particularly those concerning a developing country against a
developed country, such trade relations might be absent. By implication, unilateral
countermeasures by such a developing country would not be sufficient to induce compliance.
Thus, unless such compliance is induced, the enforcement mechanism of the WTO dispute
settlement system cannot function properly.81 Eventually, article 3.2 of the DSU and Article 55 of
the ILC’s draft Article presumably, set forth grounds for the invocation of ILC article 54 solidarity
measures. 
The DSU only set forth the purpose of countermeasure and does not say much about the
situation where inducement cannot be achieved.82 Thus, article 55 lex specialis of the ILC’s draft
states; 
”These articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of
an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international
responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of international law.”83
From this point of view, we could assume that the ILC’s Articles are meant to be applicable to all
fields of international law provided that there arises the problem of State Responsibility,84
especially where there is no alternative regime to effectively deal with such breaches. Contextually,
panels or the AB could only refrain from taking inspiration from the ILC’s draft article 54, to
recommend other WTO Members to jointly enforce the DSB recommendations, if there is a
justification that the DSU or other covered agreements have provisions dealing with illusory
countermeasures. To this extent, there seems to be no such justification.85 
It is however, true that the panel and the AB do not in any case represent judicial law-making
institutions of the WTO. Only a Ministerial Conference, as provided for in Article IX of the
WTO Agreement can lawfully perform such a task.86 Nonetheless, by arguing that the panel and
the AB could resort to the use of collective countermeasure as provided for under article 54 of the
ILC’s draft, to fill the lacunae in the DSU is not a plea to tend the panel and the AB to a judicial
law-making body of the WTO. The competence of the panel and the AB is to interpret and apply
the law and not to add or diminish the rights and obligations of the WTO Members. Obviously,
extending the application of customary international law beyond treaty interpretation to deal with
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enforcement in the dispute settlement system will not be an over-stretch of the normal judicial
bounds of the panel and AB. It would be an issue of sources of law87 and whether the WTO treaty
system is part of the general corpus of international law.88 As has been mentioned earlier, a review
of the WTO jurisprudence already demonstrates that the panel and the AB would not be
exceeding their mandates by using the ILC’s articles in adjudication. By referring to an earlier
version of the ILC’s draft (article 49 of the 1997 version), the Arbitration in the EC – Bananas case
held that ”…[c]umulative compensation or cumulative suspension of concessions by different WTO
Members for the same amount of nullification or impairment would run counter to the general
international law principle of proportionality of countermeasures”.89 Most importantly, in the
Cotton Yarn case, the AB again in justifying its position on the proportionality of countermeasures,
referred to Article 51 of the 2001 ILC’s Articles.90 Consequently, it is not self-evident as to why
the 2001 ILC’s draft article 54 may not be resorted to by the WTO dispute settlement organs.
6. Tentative Conclusions
The enquiry in this writing demonstrates that the non-effective nature of countermeasures, as a
last resort remedy in the WTO dispute settlement seems to present a threat to the credibility of
the WTO. It is true that if compared with other third parties adjudicating bodies and most
importantly the GATT, the WTO dispute settlement up to this point seems to have worked quite
well. But, it appears that the rules of international trade are generally silent as to what will happen,
if violation of the WTO obligations cannot be cured by a countermeasure taken by a relatively
small WTO Member. In this respect, and considering the fact that the WTO dispute settlement
organ already started using the ILC’s draft Articles (both the 1997 draft version and the 2001
version, adopted by the Drafting Committee on its second reading) to fill the lacunae in DSU
article 22, it would be useful for the purpose of preserving the security and predictability of the
WTO to find a way of inducing compliance through a resort to ILC’s article 54 solidarity
measures. There seems to be no provision in the DSU or any other covered agreements,
preventing the panel or the AB in doing so. Moreover, when the panels and the AB deal with
other aspects not covered by the DSU, it seems they do not generally depart from the solutions
provided for under general international law. Only in some rare cases there appear to be
derogations from the rules of general international law. As there is now a growing common
understanding that the WTO would routinely needs other public international law rules to
complement or to better understand certain of its provisions, it will be increasingly difficult to
justify why traditional international law remedy such as solidarity measures provided for under
article 54 of the ILC’s draft Articles and VCLT article 60, might not be considered so as to induce
compliance, if countermeasures taken by an LDC or developing country for instance, proves
unworkable.
Although with very limited elaboration, the primary rules that might govern collective
countermeasures as provided for under the ILC’s draft Articles, and VCLT article 60, seem to be
sufficiently precise if framed in the WTO dispute settlement context. But the danger of their
abuse might also be great. A resort to a collective countermeasure by the WTO may entail
supportive institutional procedures, transparency and political will. Though a legally clear and
circumscribed solidarity measure will be an important step towards the enhancement of the
confidence in the multilateral trading system, it would be wrong to take this important step
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